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CANADA'S LANDMARK CHAOULLI
DECISION: A VITAL BLUEPRINT FOR
CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM
Sierra Dean*
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court)
may have done more to transform Canada's health care system
than three major government health studies and an infusion of
$41 billion into the system.1 On June 9, 2005, in Chaoulli v. Quebec, the
Court invalidated a Quebec law that prohibited residents from buying
private health insurance to pay for services already covered under Ca-
nada's public health care system.2 The decision means that the Quebec
government can no longer prevent individuals from obtaining private
health insurance or force patients to endure unreasonable waiting times
for medical services. 3 The highly anticipated decision is the first to criti-
cally examine the constitutionality of Canada's public health care sys-
tem.4 It is also the first decision to strike down a health care law shown
to result in the suffering and deaths of patients. 5 Although the ruling
only applies to the province of Quebec, there are growing concerns that it
will dramatically alter the entire Canadian health care system.6
* Sierra Dean is a Juris Doctor candidate at Southern Methodist University, Dallas,
Texas. She graduated with magna cum laude honors from Texas A&M University
in 2002 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Biochemistry and Genetics.
1. CBC News Online, Health Care Introduction (2006), http://www.cbc.ca/news/back
ground/healthcare/index.html.
2. CBC News Online, The Ruling: In Reaction (2006), http://www.cbc.ca/news/back
ground/healthcare/rulingreaction.html.
3. Jacques Chaoulli, M.D., A Victory for Freedom: The Canadian Supreme Court's
Ruling on Private Health Care (June 21, 2005), in HERITAGE LECTURES, July 22,
2005, at 3, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/hl892.cfm.
4. RON A. SKOLROOD, Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General): The Supreme Court
of Canada Sets the Stage for Fundamental Health Care Reform 1 (2005), available
at http://www.lawsonlundell.com/resources/ChaoullivQuebec-HealthCareReform.
pdf.
5. Chaoulli, supra note 3, at 3.
6. See Peter J. Carver, Comment on Chaoulli v. Quebec, LAW & GOVERNANCE, http:/
/www.longwoods.com/product.php?productid=17191&page=l (last visited Mar. 15,
2006) ("The Court's judgment in Chaoulli v. Quebec may not mean the end of
medicare, but it seems likely to be the end of medicare as Canadians have known
it").
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I. CANADA'S PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Canada's universal public health care system has been a source of na-
tional pride for Canadians since its inception. 7 But it has also been sub-
ject to harsh criticism. 8 While some say the system is the best in the
world,9 others argue that it hinders Canadians from accessing the medical
services they need and deserve.10 Called Medicare, the system relies on
the principle that access to health care should be based on need rather
than on ability to pay.1' Medicare thus provides universal health cover-
age for all Canadians regardless of wealth or status.12
A. THE ORIGIN OF MEDICARE
Before 1961, only 53 percent of Canadians were insured, and health
care costs were the primary cause of bankruptcy in the country. 13 This
disturbing trend soon led to a call for a universal system of health care.14
The federal government began taking a more active role in health care
legislation, 15 and Medicare was gradually built province-by-province. 16
Saskatchewan was the first Canadian province to introduce a public
health insurance plan for hospital services in 1947.17 In 1957, the federal
government introduced the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services
Act, which provided federal cash payments to provinces that covered the
costs of hospital services. 18 Under this legislation, the federal govern-
ment and the provincial governments shared health care costs on a
roughly equal basis.' 9 Each provincial health plan had to be universally
available, portable, and publicly administered to receive federal fund-
ing.20 By the early 1960s, all provinces had public insurance plans with
universal coverage for at least in-patient hospital care. 21 In 1966, the fed-
eral government expanded coverage to include doctor's services outside
hospitals, and by 1972, all provinces universally participated in what is
7. BENEDICT IRVINE, SHANNON FERGUSON & BEN CACKETr, BACKGROUND BRIEF-
ING: THE CANADIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/Ca-
nada.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
8. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [20051 S.C.C. 35 2 (Can.).
9. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETT, supra note 7.
10. CBC News Online, Public vs. Private Health Care: FAQs, http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/healthcare/publicvs.private.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
11. Canadian Health Coalition, Reaction to the Chaoulli Decision (2005), http://www.
healthcoalition.ca/chaoulli-response.pdf.
12. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETr, supra note 7.
13. Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] S.C.C. 1 171.
14. Id. T1 56.
15. Id.
16. KAo-PING CHUA, CANADIAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM FACT SHEET, http://www.
amsa.org/studytours/CHSFactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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now Medicare. 22 Soon, however, rising costs for services and low fees to
physicians prompted many physicians to opt out of the public system in
order to bill patients directly in the private sector, a practice called extra-
billing.23 By the late 1970s, some Canadians had trouble finding provid-
ers that were in the public system, and there were calls to outlaw extra-
billing practices. 24
In 1984, in response to these concerns, the federal government intro-
duced the Canada Health Act (the Act).25 The purpose of the Act "is to
protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of re-
sidents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services
without financial or other barriers. ' 26 The Act denies federal funding to
provinces that allow extra-billing by physicians and forbids private physi-
cians from billing beyond certain amounts. 27 The Act also lists five prin-
ciples of health care: universality, accessibility, comprehensiveness, public
administration, and portability,28 which "have become the hallmarks of
Canadian identity. '29 Universality means that every individual receives
health care services on uniform terms and conditions.30 Accessibility
calls for equal access to covered hospital and physician services without
any barriers. 31 Comprehensiveness requires all medically necessary ser-
vices provided by hospitals and physicians to be insured.32 Public admin-
istration means that insurance is administered on a non-profit basis. 33
Portability calls for health coverage that is maintained when a resident
moves or travels within Canada or travels outside the country.34 Each
province must abide by all five criteria to receive federal grants.35
B. FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDICARE
1. Eligibility and Coverage
Under Medicare, every individual is covered, regardless of income,
gender, or race.36 Covered benefits include all necessary hospital and
physician services, which comprise approximately 43 percent of total
22. Id.
23. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKEIr, supra note 7.
24. Id.
25. CBC News in Review, Health Care and the Social Fabric, supra note 17.
26. Canada Health Act, R.S.C., ch. C-6, § 3 (1985).
27. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETr, supra note 7.
28. Canada Health Act § 7.
29. Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] S.C.C. 16.
30. Canada Health Act § 10.
31. Id. § 12.
32. Id. § 9.
33. Id. § 8.
34. Id. § 11.
35. CBC News in Review, Health Care and the State (2000), http://www.cbc.ca/newsin
review/Oct2000[HEALTH/STATE.HTM.
36. CHUA, CANADIAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM FACT SHEET, supra note 16.
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health care expenditures in Canada. 37 Such services include doctors' vis-
its, hospital care, surgery, and drugs while in the hospital, as well as den-
tal care for children and prescription drugs for welfare recipients and
seniors. 38 Furthermore, all Canadians have free choice of what physi-
cians and hospitals they use.39
2. Organization and Financing
Medicare is a single-payer system where the government is the sole
financer of health care.40 It is financed primarily through provincial in-
come taxes, payroll taxes, and sales taxes, and also through federal grants
funded by federal income taxes. 41 But contributions by the federal gov-
ernment continue to decline each year, with federal payments comprising
only 20 percent of total health care costs in 2002.42 In addition, although
care is free at the point of use, individuals must pay premiums in certain
provinces.43
Although the government finances Medicare, it interferes minimally
with the actual practice of medicine. 44 This system differs from socialized
medicine where a government directly owns hospitals and controls their
daily operations, and physicians work directly for the government. 45
Each of the ten Canadian provinces regulates its own health care and has
its own public health insurance plan. 46 The overall health care program,
however, is national because all provinces are governed by the Act.47 In
addition, there is a mixture of public and private delivery, 48 with roughly
75 percent of health care services in Canada delivered privately.49 Most
Canadian physicians are in private practices, and those who participate in
Medicare are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis by provincial govern-
ments. 50 But most provincial governments prohibit these physicians from
billing patients directly. 51 Furthermore, although physicians are free to
37. Gregory P. Marchildon, The Chaoulli Case: Two-Tier Magna Carta?, Law & Gov-
ernance 1, http://www.longwoods.com/product.php?productid=17190&page=l
(last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
38. Pierre Lemieux, Socialized Medicine: The Canadian Experience, THE FREEMAN,
available at http://www.theadvocates.org/freeman/8903lemi.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2006).
39. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETr, supra note 7.
40. CHUA, CANADIAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM FACT SHEET, supra note 16.
41. Id.
42. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETT, supra note 7.
43. Id.
44. KAO-PING CHUA, SINGLE PAYER 101 (2006), http://www.amsa.org/uhc/Single
Payerl0l.pdf.
45. Id.
46. CBC News in Review, Health Care and the State, supra note 35.
47. Id.
48. CHUA, CANADIAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM FACT SHEET, supra note 16.
49. CBC News Online, Public vs. Private Health Care: FAQs, supra note 10.
50. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETY, supra note 7.
51. Colleen M. Flood & Tom Archibald, The Illegality of Private Health Care in Ca-
nada, CAN. MED. ASS'N J., Mar. 20, 2001, at 826, available at http://www.cmaj.ca/
cgi/reprint/164/6/825.
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opt out of Medicare at any time,52 those who do will not receive govern-
ment funding and are forbidden to bill more than what they would make
under Medicare. 53 This makes opting out of Medicare risky for physi-
cians and keeps the system strong.54
3. Health Insurance
Although Medicare covers basic medical services, several health care
costs are not covered.5 5 These expenses include costs for prescription
drugs, dental care, vision care, long-term-care facilities, and assistive
equipment.5 6 In 2004, of the $130 billion dollars that Canada spent on
health care, $40 billion was spent on such services. 57 Canadians must pay
these costs themselves or obtain a private insurance plan to cover them.
58
Canada is the only nation other than Cuba and North Korea to prohibit
private health insurance for services already provided by the public sys-
tem.59 By comparison, most countries with compulsory government in-
surance, such as the United Kingdom, still allow individuals to purchase
private insurance if they elect to do so. 60 Six of the nine Canadian prov-
inces use this measure,61 which ultimately limits the market for opted-out
physicians because only patients who can afford to pay out-of-pocket can
use their services.62
C. A NEED FOR CHANGE
Critics of Medicare complain "that everything is free but nothing is
accessible. ' '63 Although 80 percent of Canadians claim to be satisfied
with their health care access, there are serious problems in the system.
64
Years ago, when the federal government provided approximately one-
third of the money spent on health care, lengthy wait times for treatment
were not an issue.65 But in the early 1990s, when the federal government
drastically reduced the amount of money given to provinces for health
care, complaints about health care access intensified.6 6 Today, Canadians
endure increasingly longer wait times to see specialists, undergo elective
surgery, and obtain diagnostic tests.67 Others face huge bills for prescrip-
52. Id.
53. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETT, supra note 7.
54. Id.
55. CBC News in Review, Health Care and the State, supra note 35.
56. Id.
57. CBC News Online, Public vs. Private Health Care: FAQs, supra note 10.
58. CBC News in Review, Health Care and the State, supra note 35.
59. OpinionJournal.com, Unsocialized Medicine (June 13, 2005), http://www.opinion
journal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006813.
60. Lemieux, supra note 38.
61. Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] S.C.C. 77.
62. Flood & Archibald, supra note 51, at 828.
63. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKE'IT, supra note 7.
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tion drugs,68 and there are fewer doctors, nurses, hospital beds, and hos-
pital equipment than are needed.69 There is also barely enough money to
fund hospitals, 70 with 70 percent of Canadian hospitals operating at a def-
icit in 2003.7 1 These troubles prompted major political candidates in Ca-
nada's 2004 national election to finally concede that Medicare is failing72
and led Prince Edward Island Premier Patt Binns to warn that Canada's
"system is not sustainable, the principles of the Canada Health Act are at
risk, and health care as we know it will not survive the end of the dec-
ade."'73 It finally became clear that too much emphasis had been placed
on sustaining the current system rather than on improving it.74
At the heart of Medicare reform is a variety of data on waiting times
for treatment, as well as three major health studies and a First Ministers
Conference. 75
1. Waiting List Statistics
A waiting list is a list that patients enroll in once they choose to un-
dergo an elective procedure.7 6 In Canada, waiting lists do not exist for
emergency procedures. 77 In 2003, Statistics Canada found that the me-
dian waiting time for Canadians was 4.3 weeks for surgeries, 4.0 weeks to
see a specialist, and 3.0 weeks for diagnostic tests.78 In a 2004 survey, the
Fraser Institute found that Canadian patients requiring surgery faced a
total average waiting time of 17.7 weeks, from the initial visit to the fam-
ily doctor through to surgery. 79 The survey also found that the median
waiting time for treatment was 8.4 weeks to see a specialist and 9.4 weeks
between seeing a specialist and receiving treatment. 80 Overall, 85 percent
68. Id.
69. CBC News in Review, Principles, Ideals, and Practicalities (2000), http://www.cbc.
ca/newsinreview/Oct2000/HEALTH/IDEALS.HTM.
70. D. Martin Low, Q.C., Lydia Wakulowsky & Geoff Moysa, Failing on the Funda-
mentals: The Chaoulli Decision, LAW & GOVERNANCE 3 (2005), http://www.
longwoods.com/product.php?productid=17188&page=l.
71. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, CANADIAN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM: VIEWS OF HOSPITAL EXECUTIVES 2 (2004), http://www.cmwf.org/usr-doc/
data canada_743.pdf.
72. Robert J. Cihak, The Truth About Canada's Ailing Health-Care System, THE SEAT-
TLE TIMES, July 13, 2004, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opin-
ion/2001977834_cihakl3.html.
73. Conrad F. Meier, Canadian Health Care System Nears Collapse, HEALTH CARE
NEWS, May 1, 2004, available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=14789.
74. Low, Wakulowsky & Moysa, supra note 70, at 4.
75. See, e.g., CLAUDIA SANMARTIN ET AL., Waiting for Medical Services in Canada:
Lots of Heat, but Little Light, CAN. MED. ASS'N J., May 2, 2000, available at http://
www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/162/9/1305 (evaluating the variability of wait time sta-
tistics in Canada); CBC News Online, Studied to Death? (2005), http://www.cbc.ca/
news/background/healthcare/studiedtodeath.html (discussing the major Canadian
health reports and conferences).
76. KAO-PING CHUA, WAITING LISTS IN CANADA: REALITY OR HYPE?, http://www.
amsa.org/studytours/WaitingTimes-primer.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETr, supra note 7.
80. CHUA, WAITING LISTS IN CANADA: REALITY OR HYPE?, supra note 76.
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of median waiting times exceeded clinically reasonable delays. 81 Com-
paratively, while Americans wait approximately three days for a cranial
MRI scan, Canadians wait an average of five months. 82 Studies indicate
that it can take six months to have a cataract removed in Canada, and
heart surgeons report patients dying while waiting for surgery.83 For ex-
ample, a doctor in 1999 described how 192 patients waiting to receive
coronary artery bypass surgery died or became too sick to have the sur-
gery before making it to the front of the line.84 Waiting times would ar-
guably be even longer if Canadians were unable to obtain services in the
United States.85
Due to a wide variation in quality statistics,86 the extent and nature of
the waiting list problem in Canada is not definitive.87 The shortage of
accurate data is caused by differences in wait time measurements, dispari-
ties in reporting methods, variation in how waiting lists are developed
and managed, and a lack of government standards on whether and when
a patient is placed on a waiting list.88 In addition, waiting times vary
widely by specialty, procedure, province, and region. 89 Overall, while it is
clear that waiting lists are a problem for certain elective procedures in
Canada, it is not apparent how bad the crisis really is.90
2. The Mazankowski Report
In August 2000, Alberta Premier Ralph Klein asked Don Mazankowski
for recommendations on how to control increasing health care costs. 91
On January 8, 2002, the Mazankowski Report was released and called for
increased private funding where insured services would no longer be pro-
vided solely by Medicare. 92 Among the forty-four recommendations, the
report proposed more limited coverage of Medicare, new sources of reve-
nue, province-wide health care standards, and a requirement that physi-
cians work a percentage of the time in the public system. 93 In addition,
the report suggested reduced waiting times with guaranteed access to cer-
tain procedures within ninety days of diagnosis. 94 In response to the re-
port, the government of Alberta is waiting to see what actions the federal
81. IRVINE, FERGUSON & CACKETT, supra note 7.
82. Id.
83. Lemieux, supra note 38.
84. Cihak, supra note 72.
85. OpinionJournal.com, supra note 59.
86. CHUA, WAITING LISTS IN CANADA: REALITY OR HYPE?, supra note 76.
87. TIMoTHY CAULFIELD, Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General): The Supreme Court
of Canada Deals a Blow to Publicly Funded Health Care (2005), available at http://
www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/September2005/(TC)ChaoulliCom
ment.pdf.
88. SANMARTIN ET AL., supra note 75, at 1306.
89. CHUA, WAITING LISTS IN CANADA: REALITY OR HYPE?, supra note 76.
90. Id.
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government takes before making significant changes. 95
3. The Kirby Report
The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science, and Tech-
nology studied the Canadian health care system for two years.96 The final
report, named the Kirby Report after Senator Michael Kirby, was re-
leased on October 25, 2002.97 A key component of the report was a tax
that would raise $5 billion a year to expand hospitals, buy new equip-
ment, and recruit doctors and nurses.98 In addition, the report called for
a Care Guarantee to establish maximum waiting times for each medical
procedure. 99 Under this system, if patients waited longer than the guar-
anteed time, provincial governments would be required to provide those
services through other means, 10 0 such as by paying for out-of-province or
out-of-country treatment.1 0 1 While the report encouraged the preserva-
tion of Medicare, Senator Kirby warned that if the recommendations
were not adopted, a very convincing case could be made that private
health insurance is necessary.' 0 2 He suggested that "a contribution of di-
rect payments by patients, allowing private insurance to cover some ser-
vices, even in publicly funded hospitals, and an expanded role for the
private sector in the delivery of health services are the factors which have
enabled countries to achieve broader coverage for all their citizens. ' '10 3
As of yet, the key recommendations of the Kirby Report have not been
adopted at the federal level.' 0 4
4. The Romanow Report
Roy Romanow was appointed in April 2001 to head the Commission
on the Future of Health Care in Canada (the Commission).10 5 The Com-
mission's task was to make recommendations on how to preserve Medi-
care in Canada. 10 6 The Romanow Report was released eighteen months
later and contained forty-seven recommendations.1 07 Among the key
proposals was an increase in federal contributions, stable funding where
the governments provide at least a minimum amount of money each year,





99. Antonia Maioni & Christopher Manfredi, When the Charter Trumps Health Care-
A Collision of Canadian Icons, POLICY OPTIONS DOSSIER, Sept. 2005, at 54, availa-
ble at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/sep05/maioni.pdf.
100. Id.
101. CBC News Online, Waiting for Access (2004), http://www.cbc.ca/newsiback-
ground/healthcare/waiting.html.
102. CBC News Online, Studied to Death?, supra note 75.
103. Low, Wakulowsky & Moysa, supra note 70, at 4.
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spent, and the implementation of national drug and home care plans. 10 8
The Commission observed that "[1]ong waiting times are the main, and in
many cases, the only reason some Canadians say they would be willing to
pay for treatments outside of the public health care system."'10 9 The re-
port suggested that provincial governments take immediate action to
manage wait lists by standardizing criteria and providing clear informa-
tion to patients.110 But the report also insisted that Canadian govern-
ments maintain equality of access to all citizens and preserve the integrity
of Medicare by limiting the private sector.11 In the Commission's view,
while a private health insurance option might improve waiting times for
the few who could afford it, it would make the situation worse for Medi-
care patients because necessary resources would be diverted to the pri-
vate sector.
112
5. The First Ministers Conference
In September 2004, in response to the growing concerns about health
care and waiting times surrounding the Romanow Report, Prime Minis-
ter Martin convened a First Ministers Conference. 113 In a "10-Year Plan
to Strengthen Health Care, 11 4 the ministers agreed to develop a Na-
tional Wait Times Strategy for the areas of cancer care, cardiac treatment,
diagnostic tests, joint replacements, and cataract surgeries.1 15 A set of
national wait time benchmarks were to be set by December 31, 2005, and
all provinces agreed to meet the benchmarks by December 31, 2007.116
In addition, the ministers agreed on a $41 billion infusion into Medicare
over ten years. 117 While helpful, the additional financing will not neces-
sarily solve the problems in Canada's system."18 As Canadian Medical
Association President Dr. Albert Schumacher remarked, "the increase
has 'just kept us from bleeding to death."119
D. THE HEALTH POLICY DEBATE
The debate over a single-tier system like Medicare versus a two-tiered
system where a private and public sector coexist has gained momentum in
108. Id.
109. CBC News Online, Waiting for Access, supra note 101.
110. Id.
111. CBC News Online, Studied to Death?, supra note 75.
112. CAULFIELD, supra note 87.
113. CBC News Online, Health Care Introduction, supra note 1.
114. SUSAN MUNROE, MEDICAL ALLIANCE URGES SPEED IN REDUCING HEALTH CARE
WAIT TIMES, http://canadaonline.about.com/od/healthcarecanada/a/waittimes.
htm?terms=can+wait (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
115. CBC News Online, Health Care Introduction, supra note 1.
116. WAIT TIME ALLIANCE FOR TIMELY ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, FINAL REPORT:
IT'S ABOUT TIME! 11 (2005), available at http://www.eyesite.ca/english/press/WTA!
wait-timese.pdf.
117. CBC News Online, Health Care Introduction, supra note 1.
118. Low, Wakulowsky & Moysa, supra note 70, at 3-4.
119. Id.
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Canada in recent years.120 This debate is an ongoing search for the best
use of resources to provide Canadians with timely access to care.121
1. The Case for Medicare
Proponents of Medicare believe that health is a human right.122 They
argue that access should be based on need alone 123 and that it is immoral
for some individuals to use money to purchase better health care than
others. 124 In their view, it is better that everyone receive less as long as it
is equal. 125 A majority of Canadians subscribe to this view, as evidenced
by the fact that, in Quebec, 62 percent of the population want doctor's
visits to be free, and 82 percent think people should pay nothing for hos-
pital care.' 26
Supporters of Medicare refer to evidence that countries with two-tiered
hospital systems have longer waiting lists in the public system than coun-
tries with a single-payer system. a27 For example, a 1997 study found that
patients waited almost three times longer for cataract surgery if their phy-
sicians worked in both the public and private sectors.' 28 England and
New Zealand, both with two-tiered hospital systems, have longer waiting
times in the public system than countries with single-payer systems. 29
Proponents of a single-tier system argue that profit motive in a two-tiered
system will attract doctors and resources away from the public system,
leaving those who cannot afford private insurance with inferior care and
longer wait times.' 30 Additionally, doctors practicing in both systems
have financial incentive to boost their private practices by keeping public
waiting lists long,' 3 ' and private facilities have a tendency to pick health-
ier and younger patients, leaving the more expensive patients to the pub-
lic system. 132
Those who support Medicare argue that the long waiting lists are not
the result of a fundamental flaw in the system but are instead caused by
120. THE COLLEGE OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS OF CANADA, ISSUES NOTE: PRIVATE-PUB-
LIC HEALTH CARE DEBATE IN CANADA 2, http://www.cfpc.ca/local/files/Commu-
nications/Health%20Policy/Private-public-debatel9AugO5.pdf (last visited Mar.
15, 2006).
121. Id.
122. Canadian Health Coalition, Chaoulli v. Quebec Action Alert 1 (2005), http:/www.
healthcoalition.ca/chaoulli-action2.pdfActionAlert.
123. Marchildon, supra note 37, at 2.
124. Lemieux, supra note 38.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, INSIDE THE "CHAOULLI" SUPREME
COURT RULING: WHAT THE DECISION MEANS, THE FACTS ON PRIVATE INSUR-
ANCE, AND SOLUTIONS FOR WAIT LISTS 9 (2005), available at http://cupe.ca/updir/
revCONSOLIDATED.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 12.
130. Low, Wakulowsky & Moysa, supra note 70, at 4.
131. CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, INSIDE THE "CHAOULLI" SUPREME
COURT RULING: WHAT THE DECISION MEANS, THE FACTS ON PRIVATE INSUR-
ANCE, AND SOLUTIONS FOR WAIT LISTS, supra note 127, at 8.
132. Id.
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large reductions in federal health care funding.133 They insist that the
problems can be fixed by increasing funding, not by establishing a two-
tiered health system.' 3 4 They recommend increased capital investment in
physical plants, equipment, and human resources 135 and note that Brit-
ain's public wait times were decreased by increasing public funding and
medical staff.136
Proponents of Medicare also claim that private facilities deliver a lower
standard of care 137 and undermine the education of health care practi-
tioners. 138 There is evidence to suggest that private nursing homes are
more frequently cited for deficiencies in quality and that private hospitals
have higher death rates.1 39 Additionally, because public hospitals are
used to train health professionals, the private sector potentially harms
training practices by drawing experienced staff away from the public
system. 140
Supporters of Medicare also insist that single-payer systems dramati-
cally reduce administrative costs, freeing up more money to be used for
health care services.141 As evidence that administration costs increase
with privatization, they note that administrative costs in the United States
are over 31 percent of total health care spending compared to only 16.7
percent in Canada. 142 Canada is heralded as "one of the most efficient
[countries] in terms of the ratio of productivity to administrative costs in
the world. 1 43
Supporters of Medicare refer to the current system in the United
States, the largest and most expensive two-tiered health system in the
world, as an example of what happens when a parallel system exists.144
Health care in the United States is more expensive and commercial than
in any other country.145 Roughly 14 percent of the population, 40 million
133. CHUA, WAITING LISTS IN CANADA: REALITY OR HYPE?, supra note 76.
134. Id.
135. PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, STATEMENT ON THE CANADIAN
SUPREME COURT DECISION ON PRIVATE INSURANCE 1, http://www.healthcoalition.
ca/chapnhp.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
136. CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, INSIDE THE "CHAOULLI" SUPREME
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people, are uninsured, 146 and many of the uninsured are minorities. 147
Unpaid medical bills in the United States cause 200,000 bankruptcies a
year.148 In 2004, more than 50 percent of all personal bankruptcies were
due to health care expenses, 149 and at least 18,000 Americans die each
year because of inadequate health coverage. 150 Additionally, although
the United States spends a significantly higher percentage of its GDP on
health care than Canada, overall coverage is much less in the United
States, and health outcomes are worse. 151 To avoid a system like the
United States, many Canadians remain committed to keeping Medicare
strong.152
2. The Case for a Two- Tiered System
Critics of Medicare believe that Canada's restrictions on private health
care are causing problems with access, choice, and quality in health care
services. 153 They argue that Canada, out of all countries with universal
access, spends most on health care while ranking among the lowest in
access to physicians, quality of medical equipment, and overall health
outcomes. 154 Opponents view the long waiting lists as a fundamental flaw
in Medicare and claim that waiting lists would be shortened under a two-
tiered system. 155 They also insist that individuals who can afford private
health insurance and services should be permitted to purchase them to
avoid unreasonable delays. 156 In a 2005 survey, 49 percent of Canadians
supported a private insurance option, and a majority of Canadians be-
lieved that permitting private insurance would improve waiting times,
overall access, and quality of care. 157
Opponents also argue that Medicare is unreasonably expensive.1 58 For
example, in Quebec, public health expenditures amount to 29 percent of
the entire budget.' 59 It costs $1,200 per year in taxes for each Quebec
citizen to access Medicare, which is more expensive than most private
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health insurance plans. 160 As health costs continue to rise, government
expenditures cannot keep up. 16 1 As a result, hospital equipment is often
outdated, and the number of hospital beds continues to decline. 162 Gov-
ernments also must put caps on professional fees, prompting physicians to
spend less time with their patients and take more time off.163
In addition, critics of Medicare note that since the system primarily
covers hospital and physician care, fewer health costs each year are cov-
ered by Medicare, leaving Canadians to pay more of the costs them-
selves. 164 Covered services now comprise less than half of total health
care expenditure in Canada, with care now being more focused on pre-
scription drugs and community care not covered by Medicare. 16 5 Spend-
ing on prescription drugs is rising faster than anything in Canada's health
budget and is now the second most important component of health care
spending in the country, 66 with the amount Canadians spend on pre-
scription drugs rising between 7 and 8 percent each year. 167
II. THE LANDMARK CASE: CHAOULLI V. QUEBEC
The Quebec government, like several other Canadian provinces, pro-
hibited citizens from obtaining private health insurance for services al-
ready covered under Medicare. 168 Significant delays in treatment in
Quebec's public system were a problem, and patients were forced to wait
long periods of time to receive certain medical services. 169 But because
of the restrictions on private health insurance, these patients could not
bypass the delays by seeking treatment privately. 170 They were required
to wait for treatment in the public system because it was their only
option. 17 1
A. CASE BACKGROUND
The controversy in Chaoulli v. Quebec was not whether citizens have a
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tiered system is preferable to a two-tiered system.173 Nor was the issue
whether governments can implement universal health care programs, as
all parties to the litigation agreed that only the government can provide
"the social safety net consisting of universal and accessible health
care." 174 Instead, with the concern of long wait times growing nation-
wide, the case was ultimately about the overall condition of Medicare and
whether governments may prohibit access to private health care when
many patients are forced to wait for treatment in the public system.175
1. The Parties
In 1994, 61-year-old appellant George Zeliotis began having hip
problems. 176 He had a left hip operation in 1995 but had to wait nearly a
year before he could have surgery on his right hip.177 During his wait,
Mr. Zeliotis looked into having his surgery performed at a private medi-
cal facility to receive treatment more quickly, and he also inquired about
purchasing private health insurance to cover the costs of the surgery. 178
But he soon discovered that obtaining surgery at a private facility and
purchasing private health insurance were both prohibited by Quebec
laws. 179 His only other option was paying out-of-pocket for surgery in
the United States, which was beyond his financial means. 180 Out of op-
tions, Mr. Zeliotis pleaded his case to administrators, politicians, and the
media, but to no avail. 181
Appellant Jacques Chaoulli was a Quebec physician who made various
attempts to set up a private, home-based practice for doctors making
house calls.' 82 But the regional board refused to recognize his practice in
1996, even after intense lobbying and a hunger strike to draw attention to
the situation. 183 Dr. Chaoulli then decided to opt out of Medicare but
soon discovered that few patients were willing to pay for medical services
without insurance, and opted-out physicians were barred from treating
patients in publicly funded hospitals. 184 Although Dr. Chaoulli was not
Mr. Zeliotis' physician while he was waiting for surgery, the two parties
joined forces as plaintiffs in 1997 for their legal challenge against the gov-
ernment of Quebec.185
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2. The Challenged Provisions
When the case began in 1997, the two main pieces of legislation gov-
erning health care in Quebec were the Hospital Insurance Act (HOIA)
and the Health Insurance Act (HEIA).186 The general purpose of the
statutes was to promote high quality health care for all citizens regardless
of income,'187 and they provided that the government was responsible for
funding and providing these health care services. 188 Mr. Zeliotis and Dr.
Chaoulli challenged two provisions in the acts that placed restrictions on
private health insurance and services in Quebec.189
The HOIA established access to hospital services and regulated hospi-
tals in Quebec. 190 The purpose of the HOIA was to ensure free hospital
care to residents upon uniform terms and conditions. 191 Mr. Zeliotis and
Dr. Chaoulli challenged section 11 of the HOIA, which stated that "[n]o
one shall make or renew, or make a payment under a contract under
which a resident is to be provided with.., any hospital service that is one
of the insured services. ' 192 This provision prohibited private insurance
only for basic medical services already covered by Medicare. 193 Even
under the act, patients were free to purchase private insurance for all
other health services.' 94
The HEIA regulated health care insurance in Quebec' 95 and ensured
access to necessary medical services for all Quebec residents. 196 Mr. Ze-
liotis and Dr. Chaoulli challenged section 15 of the HEIA, which stated
that "[n]o person shall make ... a contract of insurance under which an
insured service is furnished."'1 97 Like the HOIA, this provision prohib-
ited private insurance for services covered by Medicare.' 98 It also prohib-
ited opted-out physicians from billing more than what they would receive
under Medicare.1 99
3. The Constitutional Guidelines
Although the Quebec legislature is responsible for deciding what
health care system is best for residents, this decision is subject to constitu-
tional limitations.200 Courts review the constitutionality of laws passed
by the government of Quebec against both the Canadian Charter of
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Rights and Freedoms (the Canadian Charter) and the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms (the Quebec Charter). 20 1 The Canadian
Charter is part of the Canadian Constitution and applies to all govern-
ments and people in Canada. 20 2 Meanwhile, the Quebec Charter was
passed by Quebec's National Assembly and only applies to the province
of Quebec. 20 3
a. The Canadian Charter
During the 1990s, it became increasingly common for courts to use the
Canadian Charter in decisions regarding health care policy.20 4 Section 7
of the Canadian Charter reads, "[elveryone has the right to life, liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. ' 20 5 Thus, there
is a two-step analysis under section 7 where the claimant has a dual bur-
den of proof.20 6 First, a claimant must prove that there was a violation of
the right to life, liberty, or security of the person. 207 Second, the claimant
must prove that the violation was not in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.208 In general, principles of fundamental justice are
traditional rules that Canadian society is built upon.20 9 They are princi-
ples that can be precisely identified and that are generally accepted
among reasonable people.210 Courts have previously recognized the re-
spect for human dignity, the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty, the right to a fair and impartial trial, and fair punishment as exam-
ples of principles of fundamental justice.211 Generally, to be in accor-
dance with principles of fundamental justice, a government must not act
arbitrarily or without good cause.2 12 Legislation is arbitrary where it
lacks a factual connection to the objective underlying the legislation. 213
If a claimant can prove deprivation of rights under section 7, the gov-
ernment then has the burden of proof to show that the violation is justi-
fied under section 1 of the Canadian Charter.21 4 Section 1 reads, "[t]he
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
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as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 215 In
order for a law to be justified under section 1, the government must show
that the goal of the law is pressing and substantial and also that the law is
reasonable in that: (1) there is a rational connection between the law and
the legislative objective; (2) the law impairs the guaranteed right only
minimally; and (3) the effect of the law is proportionate to its
objective. 216
b. The Quebec Charter
The sweeping purpose of the Quebec Charter is to guarantee respect
for human beings.217 Under section 1 of the Quebec Charter, all human
beings are guaranteed the "right to life, and to personal security, inviola-
bility and freedom. ' 218 Under this provision, there is no reference to
principles of fundamental justice as in the Canadian Charter.219 Thus,
there is not a dual burden of proof on the claimant as there is under
section 7 of the Canadian Charter. 220 Under section 1 of the Quebec
Charter, a claimant must only prove a violation of one of the enumerated
rights. 221 Therefore, the Quebec Charter has a scope that is potentially
broader than the Canadian Charter.222
Even if a section 1 right has been violated, the government can still
show that the violation is justified under section 9.1 of the Quebec Char-
ter. 223 Section 9.1 is similar to section 1 of the Canadian Charter.224 It
reads, "[i]n exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall
maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the gen-
eral well-being of the citizens of Quebec. '225 The test to be applied
under section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter is similar to the test under sec-
tion 1 of the Canadian Charter;226 that is, in order for legislation to be
justified, it must be neither irrational nor arbitrary, and the means chosen
must be proportionate to the intended result. 227
4. The Claims
The appellants in Chaoulli contended that the Quebec government's
prohibition on private insurance deprived patients of expedient access to
health care by forcing them to wait for treatment in the public system. 228
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They claimed these waiting lists violated the rights to life and to personal
security, inviolability, and freedom under section 1 of the Quebec Char-
ter and section 7 of the Canadian Charter and were therefore unconstitu-
tional.229 In their view, delays in treatment resulted in a higher chance
that a patient's illness could become fatal, and this risk of death was a
violation of the patient's right to life.230 They also argued that delays in
treatment caused patients to experience great psychological suffering,
which infringed on the security of a person to be free from physical,
mental, or psychological harm.231 Lastly, according to the appellants, the
Quebec government's limitation on private health insurance was arbi-
trary and therefore not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.232
The government of Quebec argued that a parallel private system would
divert resources away from the public sector and consequently harm the
quality of public care.233 It claimed that the prohibition did not violate
the principles of fundamental justice because the protection of Medicare
was an important government objective that could only be achieved by
limiting access to private health care.234
5. Previous Litigation
a. Superior Court of Quebec
Mr. Zeliotis and Dr. Chaoulli brought the first action in the Superior
Court of Quebec in 1997,235 and the ruling was delivered in 2000.236 Jus-
tice Piche found that the Canadian Charter section 7 rights of life, liberty,
and security of the person included the right to adequate health care 237
but also noted that there was no right to determine the source of that
care.238 She recognized that waiting lists were long239 and agreed that
these lists constituted a violation of an individual's right to receive ade-
quate health care.240 But she found that limitations on private insurance,
while impeding some individual rights, were legitimate means of protect-
ing the combined rights of the rest of Canadian citizens. 241 Justice Piche
observed that the evidence did not conclusively prove that a private
health care system would solve the waiting list problems.242 She found
that the purpose of "the prohibition was to ensure equality in Quebec's
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public health care system by discouraging the development of a parallel
private health care system. '243 In her view, the establishment of a private
system would threaten the integrity of Medicare, and a limitation on ac-
cess to private care was necessary to protect the current system.244 She
therefore found the prohibition to be in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice and constitutional under the Canadian Charter. 245
b. Quebec Court of Appeal
Mr. Zeliotis and Dr. Chaoulli next appealed to the Quebec Court of
Appeal, but it upheld the Superior Court decision and dismissed the ap-
peal in 2002.246 Unlike the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal found
that section 7 of the Canadian Charter was not relevant to the case be-
cause the right to health care is an economic right and not fundamental to
an individual's life.247 It observed that wait lists did not pose "a real,
imminent or foreseeable deprivation" of rights.248 It also upheld the Su-
perior Court's conclusion that even if there had been a violation of sec-
tion 7 rights, the violation would have been constitutional because the
limitations were necessary to restrict the development of a parallel pri-
vate system. 249
B. THE COURT'S DECISION
Following the decision by the Court of Appeal, Mr. Zeliotis and Dr.
Chaoulli appealed to the Court 250 for a one-day hearing on June 8,
2004.251 By the time the appeal was granted in May 2003, additional par-
ties had joined the lawsuit.252 Organizations and businesses with a direct
economic stake in the decision sided with the appellants.253 Five other
provinces, Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, New Brunswick, and
Saskatchewan, as well as high-profile interest groups, sided with the gov-
ernment of Quebec. 254 The central issue on appeal was "whether the
prohibition [wa]s justified by the need to preserve the integrity of the
public system. '255 In a surprising decision, the Court overturned the de-
cisions of the two lower courts.256 The decision was highly divided, with
four of the seven justices siding with the appellants and the other three
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justices dissenting.2 57 The Court found that Quebec's ban on private
health insurance for services already covered under Medicare violated
the Quebec Charter and was therefore unconstitutional. 25 8 Despite the
varying opinions, there was one common idea shared by every justice
hearing the case.259 They all agreed that rights are violated when suffer-
ing patients are required to endure long delays while waiting for medical
treatment.260 This suffering encompasses not only death and physical
harm but also mental stress and anguish as well. 261
1. The Majority Opinion
In her majority opinion, Justice Deschamps found the prohibition to be
unconstitutional under section 1 of the Quebec Charter.262 She observed
that waiting lists caused delays in treatment and that these delays in-
creased a patient's risks of mortality, pain, suffering, and irreparable in-
jury.263 She concluded that these risks violated the rights to life and
personal inviolability under section 1 of the Quebec Charter.264
Justice Deschamps then concluded that the violation of section 1 rights
was not justified under section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter.265 Although
she agreed that the purpose of the ban was legitimate and that the prohi-
bition was rationally related to its objective, she found that it more than
minimally impaired individuals and was therefore unconstitutional.266
First, she found that the government of Quebec failed to meet its burden
of proof under section 9.1 because there was insufficient evidence to
show that a parallel private health care system would harm Medicare. 267
Second, after reviewing health care plans in other Canadian provinces
and western democracies, she observed that there were a variety of other
measures available to protect the integrity of Medicare aside from a ban
on private insurance.268 Lastly, she disagreed that the court should defer
to the legislature on matters of social policy. 26 9 She commented that
"[tihe courts have a duty to rise above political debate. They leave it to
the legislatures to develop social policy. But when such social policies
infringe rights that are protected by the charters, the courts cannot shy
away from considering them. ' 270
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Because Justice Deschamps found the prohibition to be unconstitu-
tional under the Quebec Charter, she declined to assess the issue under
the Canadian Charter. 271 The three justices in the concurring opinion
also found the prohibition to be unconstitutional under the Quebec Char-
ter, so the decision only impacts the province of Quebec, rather than all
of Canada. 272
2. The Concurring Opinion
In their concurring opinion, Justices McLachlin, Major, and Bastarache
agreed with Justice Deschamps that Quebec's limitation on private health
insurance violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter.273 But they con-
cluded that the prohibition also violated the rights of life and security of
the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter. 274 The justices em-
phasized that the Canadian Charter does not include a constitutional
right to health care.275 But they found that the prohibition created "a
virtual monopoly for the public health scheme" that resulted in impermis-
sible delays in treatment. 276 They observed that the problem of waiting
lists was significant and severe277 and noted that, "[aiccess to a waiting
list is not access to health care .... [T]here is unchallenged evidence that
in some serious cases, patients die as a result of waiting lists for public
health care."'278 The justices found that delays in treatment resulting
from these waiting lists caused significant anxiety and depression in pa-
tients279 and that such physical and psychological suffering violated the
right to security of the person under section 7.280 In cases where the pa-
tient was at risk of dying, they found that delays in treatment also vio-
lated the section 7 right to life.281
The justices then concluded that the insurance prohibition was contrary
to the principles of fundamental justice because it was arbitrary.282 They
were not persuaded that allowing private health care insurance would
have a detrimental impact on Medicare. 283 In fact, the justices empha-
sized that the existence of a parallel private system would serve to
strengthen Medicare rather than undermine it.284 Because they could
find no evidence that the prohibition of private insurance was necessary
to maintain the integrity of Medicare, they found the prohibition to be
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arbitrary and in direct violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter. 285
Finally, the three justices evaluated the prohibition under section 1 of
the Canadian Charter, where they concluded that it was not justified.286
They agreed that the maintenance of a strong public system was a legiti-
mate goal.287 But in assessing proportionality, they found that the prohi-
bition failed to meet two requirements of the three-prong test.288 First,
they found no rational connection between the prohibition of private in-
surance and the goal of protecting Medicare. 289 Second, they concluded
that the ban impaired the rights of individuals more than minimally.290
Because the prohibition could not ultimately be justified under section 1,
the justices concluded that it must be struck down as unconstitutional. 291
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Justices Binnie, LeBel, and Fish dissented and concluded that the pro-
hibition did not violate either the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Char-
ter.292 The justices agreed that, in some circumstances, a ban on private
insurance could violate the rights to life and security of the person under
the Canadian Charter because it could put patients at risk of suffering
and death.293 But in their view, the issue should not be resolved by con-
stitutional law.294 They emphasized that the implementation of a two-tier
health care system would be contrary to the policy adopted by both the
Quebec legislature and the federal government, and would be an ex-
treme, unwarranted shift in Canadian health policy.295 The justices em-
phasized that it is not the role of courts to settle the health care debate
and that the determination of private versus public health care is a social
policy issue that should be resolved by legislatures rather than by
judges. 296 They noted that legislatures "are elected to make these sorts of
decisions, and have access to a broader range of information, more points
of view, and a more flexible investigative process than courts do. ' '297
Furthermore, the justices concluded that the prohibition was in accor-
dance with the principles of fundamental justice because it was not arbi-
trary.298 They determined that the goal of the Quebec legislature was to
promote high quality health care for as many people as possible, regard-
less of status or wealth.2 99 In their view, the prohibition on private insur-
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ance was rationally related to and consistent with that objective. 300 They
found that expansion of the private sector would ultimately harm Medi-
care 30 1 and concluded that prohibiting private health insurance would de-
ter such expansion, thereby protecting the integrity of Medicare. 30 2
Ultimately, according to the justices, because the prohibition was in ac-
cordance with the principles of fundamental justice, it was constitutional
under the Canadian Charter. 30 3 The justices used similar reasoning to
declare the laws constitutional under the Quebec Charter as well.30 4
C. THE EVIDENCE FACTOR
The difference in the conclusions reached by the majority and dissent-
ing justices hinged primarily on interpretation and use of evidence. 30 5
The majority justices discounted a large portion of the expert testimony
accepted by the trial court, choosing instead to study health systems of
other Canadian provinces and western democracies. 30 6 Meanwhile, the
dissenting justices deferred to the trial court's interpretation of the evi-
dence and government health reports.30 7
1. Expert Testimony and Reports
Justices McLachlin, Major, and Bastarache accepted some expert testi-
mony from the trial court regarding the seriousness of the waiting list
problem.30 8 They noted that patients with coronary disease are "sitting
on a bomb" and can therefore die while on waiting lists.309 They also
noted that 95 percent of Canadians waiting for knee replacement surgery
must wait up to two years and that such delays subject the patients to
great pain and increased risk of irreparable injury.310 The majority jus-
tices also relied on an interim Kirby Report that concluded that a parallel
private system does not negatively impact a public health care system.311
The interim Kirby report noted "that far from undermining public health
care, private contributions and insurance improve the breadth and quality
of health care for all citizens. '312 On the other hand, the justices rejected
evidence from the Romanow Report, noting that it was "a matter of some
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debate ... [that] cannot be determinative of this litigation. 3 13
The majority justices also reviewed the trial court expert testimony ar-
guing both in favor of and against the prohibition.314 The government's
experts in health administration and policy claimed that removing the
prohibition would harm the quality of Medicare by making private health
services more accessible. 315 But the justices observed that the experts did
not have knowledge in waiting times for treatment, and they did not base
their opinions on actual economic studies or experiences of other coun-
tries.316 The appellants' experts claimed that prohibiting private health
insurance was not necessary to protect the public system. 317 They empha-
sized that a private insurance option would reduce the burden on Medi-
care by making alternative medical care more accessible, thereby
improving health care for everyone. 318 Every justice in the majority re-
jected the expert testimony for both sides on grounds that the opinions
were based solely on "'common sense' arguments, amounting to little
more than assertions of belief. '319
Meanwhile, the dissenting justices relied on evidence accepted by the
trial judge that a private system would divert resources away from the
public system, deal only with low risk patients, and lessen government
support, ultimately resulting in decreased funding for Medicare. 320 They
pointed to evidence that patients who use physicians working in both the
public and private sectors wait longer than patients who use physicians
working solely in the public sector. 321 They also relied on expert testi-
mony that parallel private heath insurance would increase overall health
care costs. 322 The dissenting justices referred to the final Kirby Report,
which, unlike the interim report relied on by the majority, concluded that
''allowing a private parallel system will ... make the public waiting lines
worse." 323 They observed that the Romanow Report also recommended
continuation of a single-tier system.324
The dissenting justices also found that the lack of accurate data on
waiting times for treatment made it impossible to determine exactly how
serious the waiting list problem really was 325 and noted that waiting times
alone do not prove that a health care system is failing. 326 The justices
observed that waiting lists are a necessary and implicit form of rationing
in the health care system because the potential market for health services
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is limitless.327 By this view, waiting lists "are the inevitable result of a
public system that can consequently offer universal access to health ser-
vices within the limits of sustainable public spending, '328 and any alterna-
tives to this are financially infeasible.329 The justices commented that
rationing in Canada's system occurs based on medical need rather than
on income and therefore the patients who are in most need of care gener-
ally receive it first.330 Any exceptions to this, they noted, should be ad-
dressed on a case-by-case basis.331
2. Other Canadian Provinces
Justice Deschamps relied on mechanisms used by other Canadian prov-
inces to limit private sector expansion. 332 While three of the provinces,
Alberta, British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island, only prohibit pri-
vate health insurance, the other six provinces successfully use other mea-
sures as well.333 Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Manitoba prohibit opted-out
physicians from billing more than what they would receive under Medi-
care, thereby eliminating the financial incentive for physicians to opt
out.334 Of these three provinces, Nova Scotia does not prohibit private
health insurance. 335 Ontario and Manitoba prohibit private insurance,
but they refund amounts paid by patients to opted-out physicians. 336 Sas-
ketchewan, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland are completely open to
the private sector, and residents are free to purchase private health insur-
ance. 337 New Brunswick permits physicians to set their own fees, while
Saskatchewan allows only opted-out physicians to set their own fees. 338
Newfoundland reimburses patients for fees paid to opted-out physicians,
up to the amount covered by Medicare. 339 Ultimately, because there was
no evidence that the public health care systems in these provinces were
disadvantaged, the majority concluded that prohibiting private health in-
surance was not the only effective way to discourage expansion of the
private sector. 340 Even the dissenting justices acknowledged that other
mechanisms were available to provinces aside from a ban on private
insurance.341
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3. Other Western Democracies
The majority justices also relied heavily on the public health care sys-
tems of other western democracies that allow access to private health in-
surance. 342 In their view, this evidence was the best indicator of whether
a prohibition on private insurance was necessary to protect the quality of
Medicare. 343 They relied primarily on the health care systems of Austra-
lia, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany.344 Australia's public
system is financed in the same manner as Quebec's system, yet private
and public sectors coexist in Australia, and private health insurance is
available.345 The Australian government balances the parallel sectors by
allowing taxpayers to deduct 30 percent of the cost of -private insur-
ance.346 The United Kingdom does not prohibit private health insurance
nor limit a physician's ability to opt out of the public system. 347 But phy-
sicians are limited in the amounts they can bill in the private sector.348
Notably, only 8 percent of hospital beds in the United Kingdom are pri-
vate, and only 11.5 percent of Britons had obtained private insurance in
1998.349 Sweden does not prohibit private health insurance nor refund
private health care costs, yet private insurance accounts for only 2 per-
cent of total health care spending, and there are only nine private hospi-
tals.350 Meanwhile, Sweden's universal public system has wider coverage
than Canada's system.351 In Germany, although private health insurance
is available, 88 percent of the population remains in the public system.352
Ultimately, the majority justices concluded that the experiences of
these countries proved that a private insurance alternative would not
harm or destroy Medicare in Quebec. 353 They observed that these coun-
tries can deliver "medical services that are superior to and more afforda-
ble than the services that are presently available in Canada" while still
allowing for a private sector.354 Because the mechanisms used in these
countries successfully discourage doctors, patients, and services from
moving to the private sector,355 the justices found that a prohibition of
private insurance was not necessary to protect the integrity of
Medicare. 356
In contrast, the dissenting justices suggested that the experiences of
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other countries were not determinative. 357 They noted that it was dan-
gerous to explore the unfamiliar health care systems of other countries
because each system is unique,358 and no single international model ex-
ists.359 They also observed that the evidence of these countries showed
that an increase in private funding will lead to a decrease in public
funding.360
III. THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE IN CANADA
Following the Chaoulli ruling, the Quebec and federal governments
asked for an eighteen month suspension of the decision. 361 The govern-
ments claimed they needed time to analyze the impact of the decision in
light of the Act and also to devise measures to respond to the ruling.362
Two months after issuing the judgment, the Court granted a one-year sus-
pension, retroactive to June 9, 2005, which means there will be no change
in Quebec law until June 9, 2006.363
A. THE REAL IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The decision in its narrow sense means that the two challenged provi-
sions in the HEIA and HOIA are invalidated, at least as of June 9, 2006,
when the suspension ends.364 But the ruling promises to have a much
more profound impact, one that "will undoubtedly shape the public/pri-
vate health care debate throughout Canada, both in terms of how other
provincial governments structure their medical plans and potentially as a
basis for further legal challenges. ' 365 The potential effects of the decision
are being rabidly debated.366 Some believe the decision opens the flood-
gates to private care 367 and signals the end of Medicare in Canada.368
Others argue that a two-tiered system will not result as long as Medicare
is strengthened.369 Admittedly, the impact of the decision is difficult to
predict and highly speculative. 370 But upon close inspection, it seems
most likely that the decision will serve as a catalyst to finally force Cana-
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dian governments to address the problem of scarce medical resources and
long waiting times. 371
1. Future Litigation
Traditionally, courts have given rather restricted health care rights to
Canadians under the Canadian Charter.372 But the majority in Chaoulli
recognized the right of Canadians to have reasonable access to health
care. 373 All seven justices recognized that undue delay in obtaining
health care may violate the rights of life and security of the person under
the Canadian Charter in certain circumstances. 374 This means that citi-
zens can now make claims against governments when they face delays in
treatments, and governments must act to ensure reasonable access. 375
Because of this, an increase in similar lawsuits in other provinces is
likely.3
76
While future litigation involving access to health care is expected, it is
unclear how the Court will rule in such cases because it was so highly
divided in the Chaoulli decision. 377 Only three justices found that there is
a right to timely health care access under section 7 of the Canadian Char-
ter,378 which leaves open the question of whether the Canadian Charter
can be used successfully in future litigation involving similar prohibi-
tions.379 In addition, the composition of the Court has changed since the
decision was handed down.380 Two recent appointees to the Court, Jus-
tices Abella and Charron, did not participate in the Chaoulli decision, so
future cases involving this issue may give rise to a different outcome. 381
A further complication is that the split between the majority and dissent-
ing opinions revolved around very different interpretations of the evi-
dence. 382 Unless a new major health study provides better insight into
waiting times and medical care standards, other governments and courts
will likely encounter the same difficulties in evaluating the data.383
Furthermore, because the majority gave no guidance as to what consti-
tutes reasonable care, this standard will have to be developed in future
litigation. 384 As the dissenting justices noted, "What, then, are constitu-
tionally required 'reasonable health services'? . . . The majority does not
tell us. The majority lays down no manageable constitutional stan-
371. Low, Wakulowsky & Moysa, supra note 70, at 2.
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dard. ' 385 The lack of an applicable standard leaves the door open to fu-
ture challenges based on any wait time whatsoever. 386 It is also unclear
from the decision whether other problems, such as a patient's inability to
pay for certain medical services, will qualify as a violation of the right to
reasonable health care access, so future litigation to assess these ques-
tions is likely.387
2. The Role of Courts
The Chaoulli decision also has potential impact on the role that Cana-
dian courts will play in determining health care policy in the future. 388
The case suggests that Canadian courts now have a strengthened role in
health care issues.389 Traditionally, courts have not interfered in govern-
ment health care decisions, instead allowing legislatures to determine
Canadians' access to medical treatment. 390 But now that a right to timely
access to health care has been established, the role of courts is signifi-
cantly broader in that courts will now be responsible for determining ex-
actly what constitutes timely access. 391 Patients who claim that their
rights of access are violated will be able to resort to the courts for help,
and the courts will be able to force the government to change its policies
accordingly. 392
3. Medicare
Many people have interpreted the Chaoulli decision as opening the
door to private health care across Canada. 393 Proponents of Medicare
fear the decision will make room for a two-tier health care system as ex-
ists in the United States.394 As the dissenting justices noted, "[p]rivate
insurance is a condition precedent to, and aims at promoting, a flourish-
ing parallel private health care sector." 395 But this is unlikely to be the
case.396 Because Chaoulli was ultimately decided under the Quebec
Charter and not the Canadian Charter, the ruling itself is limited only to
the province of Quebec. 3 97 Other Canadian provinces are not directly
385. Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] S.C.C. 163.
386. Colleen M. Flood & Terrence Sullivan, Supreme Disagreement: The Highest Court
Affirms an Empty Right, CAN. MED. ASS'N. J., July 19, 2005, at 1, available at http:/
/www.cmaj.ca/cgi/rapidpdf/cmaj.050759vl.
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impacted, and the Act remains fully in effect.398 While there will likely
be a short burst of private clinic expansion in Quebec, this will not have a
dramatic impact on the public system because private clinics have existed
for years.399 But some initial shortages in public practices are possible. 400
A crucial aspect of the majority's decision is that it found that access to
health care was reduced by two factors: public waiting lists and limited
access to private treatment. 40 1 Because the Court could not remedy the
waiting list crisis, the only action it could take was to allow greater access
to private health care.402 The Court did not state that the Quebec gov-
ernment must increase access to private care unconditionally. 40 3 It only
stated that greater access must be allowed if patients do not receive suita-
ble treatment within the public system. 40 4 The majority justices noted
that a "prohibition on obtaining private health insurance, while it might
be constitutional in circumstances where health care services are reasona-
ble as to both quality and timeliness, is not constitutional where the pub-
lic system fails to deliver reasonable services. '405 This indicates that bans
on private health insurance could possibly withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge if Medicare is implemented in a way that avoids long wait lists.406
Therefore, if governments can reduce waiting times and ensure that pa-
tients receive treatment in a timely manner, then they may be able to
limit access to private insurance. 40 7 But if waiting lists continue to be a
problem, patients should be allowed to receive faster care through the
private system if they choose to do so.40 8
Even if Quebec removes the prohibition against private insurance, it
can legally replace it with other forms of regulated access to minimize the
impact of the decision. 40 9 Justice Deschamps noted that "Quebec has the
power under the Constitution to discourage the establishment of a paral-
lel health care system. '410 As shown by the evidence in Chaoulli, there is
a variety of constitutional legal tools available for provinces to maintain a
single-tier public health system.411 Quebec arguably does not need a pro-
hibition on private insurance to minimize the private sector because it
already has several constitutional mechanisms at its disposal to serve the
same purpose.412 Ultimately, if Quebec can legally prevent a flourishing
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399. Steven Lewis, Medicare's Fate: Are we Fiddlers or Firefighters?, LAW & GOVERN-
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private sector, then the right to purchase private insurance is altogether
meaningless. 41
3
B. A CALL FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION
In the end, the Chaoulli ruling "is not a license to privatize," even in
Quebec.4 14 Instead, the case represents a wake-up call for Canadian gov-
ernments to strengthen Medicare.41 5 The Chaoulli decision makes it
clear that the issue of medical access and waiting lists can no longer be
ignored by governments. 416 As the majority noted in their opinion,
"[g]overnments have promised on numerous occasions to find a solution
to the problem of waiting lists .... [I]t seems that governments have lost
sight of the urgency of taking concrete action. The courts are therefore
the last line of defen[s]e for citizens. '4 17 In this respect, the decision is a
blessing in disguise for Canadians, regardless of what form of health care
system they support.418 While some may disagree that courts are respon-
sible for resolving health policy issues, the Court's involvement in
Chaoulli was a necessary result of Canadian governments' failure to ad-
dress the recurring problems in Medicare. 419
The government of Quebec, along with all other provincial govern-
ments, should use the grace period until June 2006 to improve health care
access by dealing with the problem of waiting lists.420 Governments must
act quickly to ensure that patients have timely access to quality medical
services. 421 Although several developments have been made since
Chaoulli first began in 1997, including increased federal spending and a
plan to improve waiting lists, there is more that can be done. 422 The rul-
ing should encourage governments to speed up their schedules and re-
duce waiting lists sooner than originally planned. 4 23 As agreed upon at
the First Ministers Conference, the Wait Time Alliance released its final
report on benchmark waiting times in August 2005, two months after the
Chaoulli decision was announced. 424 In response to the decision, the re-
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port recommends that provincial governments hurry to meet the new
benchmark times by March 31, 2006, twenty-one months ahead of the
original schedule.425 Governments should strive to meet these bench-
mark waiting times to ensure timely access. 426 Governments should also
consider additional health care funding to improve the waiting list situa-
tion.427 The Wait Time Alliance final report suggests that an additional
$3 billion over five years is necessary to reduce waiting times.428 The
report emphasizes that this money should be used to add more doctors
and nurses to the system and to reimburse patients for out-of-country or
out-of-province medical services. 429 The Wait Time Alliance report also
recommends a 4-M Toolbox of Strategies to mitigate, measure, monitor,
and manage wait times. 430 Using the report as a guide, provincial govern-
ments should implement a system of wait list management to ensure that
lists are kept current and that waiting patients are followed up regu-
larly.431 Additionally, governments can pursue incentive strategies such
as withholding payments to hospitals that do not have adequate wait time
management systems in place.432
Furthermore, provincial governments should use this opportunity to
strengthen and expand Medicare. 433 For example, they can invest more
money in public health care delivery434 and increase the number of health
care workers. 435 They can establish a national home care plan to reduce
the pressure on hospitals for resources.436 They can also implement a
national pharmacare plan for prescription drugs to increase the coverage
of Medicare. 437 Finally, they can increase efficiency by operating public
emergency rooms at full capacity and creating public surgery clinics. 438
In addition to improving the quality and breadth of Medicare, govern-
ments can also employ various legal measures to halt the growth of pri-
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vate insurance and delivery.439 For example, they can refuse to subsidize
private care and personnel.440 They can prohibit physicians from practic-
ing in both the public and the private sectors441 and prohibit opted-out
physicians from billing more privately than they would make under Medi-
care.442 Governments can reward medical students who sign contracts to
practice exclusively in the public sector.443 Governments can also strictly
adhere to the principles of the Act by withholding funding to provinces
that violate the Act by allowing privatization to expand.
4 44
C. A BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE
Inevitably, the Chaoulli decision will spur public debate on Medicare
and general health policy in Canada for years to come. 445 It dares
Canadians to finally reevaluate their beloved health care system446 and
promises to be an impetus of much-needed change in Canadian Medi-
care.447 In the end, the Chaoulli decision is an ultimatum for Canadian
governments to either strengthen and improve Medicare or permit the
development of a private system. 448 If Canadian governments are com-
mitted to preserving Medicare, as they say they are, then they must take
action. 449 If they do not, courts will continue to intervene in cases where
Medicare fails to deliver reasonable and timely services, and private
health care will continue to expand.450 Whichever road Canadian gov-
ernments take in the future, Medicare in Canada likely will never be the
same again. 45 1 As Ray Romanow himself noted, "[t]he blueprint for
change is there - it's just waiting to be put into practice. 452
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